Share 35 was implemented to provide improved access to organs for patients with Model for End-Stage Liver Disease (MELD) scores 35. However, little is known about the impact of Share 35 on organ offer acceptance rates. We evaluated all liver offers to adult patients who were ultimately transplanted between January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2015. The analyses focused on patients ranked in the top 5 positions of a given match run and used multilevel mixed-effects models, clustering on individual wait-list candidate and transplant center. There was a significant interaction between Share 35 era and MELD category (P < 0.001). Comparing offers to MELD score 35 patients, offers after Share 35 were 36% less likely to be accepted compared with offers to MELD score 35 patients before Share 35 (adjusted odds ratio, 0.64). There was no clinically meaningful difference in the donor risk index of livers that were declined for patients with an allocation MELD score 35 in the pre-versus post-Share 35 era. Organ offer acceptance rates for patients with an allocation MELD 35 decreased in every region after Share 35; the magnitude of these changes was bigger in regions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 11, compared with regions 8 and 9 that had regional sharing in place before Share 35. There were significant changes in organ offer acceptance rates at the center level before versus after Share 35, and these changes varied across centers (P < 0.001). In conclusion, in liver transplantation candidates achieving a MELD score 35, liver acceptance of offers declined significantly after implementation of Share 35. The alterations in behavior at the center level suggest that practice patterns changed as a direct result of Share 35. Changes in organ acceptance under even broader organ sharing (redistricting) would likely be even greater, posing major logistical and operational challenges, while potentially increasing discard rates, thus decreasing the total number of transplants nationally.
Between 2002 and 2013, prioritization on the liver transplantation (LT) waiting list for patients with chronic liver failure (excludes status 1 patients with acute liver failure) followed a sickest-first prioritization whereby organs were first distributed at the local level of the donor service area (DSA). However, on June 18, 2013, Share 35 was enacted to allow for broader sharing of organs within Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN)/United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) regions for patients with Model for End-Stage Liver Disease (MELD) scores 35. This policy was enacted because of the high wait-list mortality in patients with the highest MELD scores, and it sought to decrease wait-list mortality by expanding the donor pool for these patients. (1, 2) As a result of Share 35, patients with MELD scores 35 have had an increased number of organ offers, the intention of broader regional sharing. (3, 4) An early evaluation of organ offer and match run data in the first year after Share 35 demonstrated that organ offer acceptance rates for the highest MELD patients decreased. (3) This was an important finding. However, several questions remain unanswered:
1. Was the change in acceptance rates a temporary change or did it represent a sustained behavioral change?
Abbreviations: CI, confidence interval; CNS, central nervous system; CVA, cerebrovascular accident; DBD, donation after brain death; DCD, donation after cardiac death; DRI, donor risk index; DSA, donor service area; HCC, hepatocellular carcinoma; IQR, interquartile range; LSAM, Liver Simulation Allocation Model; LT, liver transplantation; MELD, Model for End-Stage Liver Disease; OPO, organ procurement organization; OPTN, Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network; OR, odds ratio; SD, standard deviation; UNOS, United Network for Organ Sharing.
2. How did practice patterns change before versus after Share 35 for those with a MELD score of <35 or 35 (interaction of MELD score and era)? 3. Were there observed among-center differences in organ offer acceptance rates?
An understanding of the changes in behavior after implementation of this policy is more than just an academic exercise. In LT, we rely on the Liver Simulation Allocation Models (LSAMs) to predict the impact of policy changes, and based on these calculations, we make decisions to enact policies. LSAM acceptance rates are based on existing behaviors, and LSAM cannot predict how changes in behavior may impact predictions. Specifically, "LSAM assumes that all centers and organ procurement organizations (OPOs) implement allocation policies in the same way and exhibit the same organ acceptance behavior. LSAM also does not model any directed or expedited allocation of donated organs." (5) For these reasons, evaluating how center behavior changes with respect to organ acceptance is critical if we choose to accurately predict the full impact of future policies associated with broader organ sharing.
Patients and Methods

STUDY SAMPLE
We evaluated data from the OPTN/UNOS to evaluate all organ offers (match runs) to adult patients between January 1, 2011 through December 31, 2015. This allowed for an analysis of approximately 2.5 years of before and after Share 35. These organ offer data only included data on livers that were ultimately transplanted. We focused analyses on patients ranked in the top 5 positions of a given match run (if applicable) as nearly three-quarters of all organ transplants occur in these patients (this included status 1 patients and offers that were offered regionally and then locally and vice versa). Furthermore, the highest-ranked patients are those whose rank on a given match run would be most influenced by the Share 35 policy. (6) Out of the total 31,666 unique match runs during the study period where the liver was transplanted, we excluded match runs in which the highest-ranked patient was <18 years of age (n 5 7929 match runs) or a multiorgan transplant candidate (excluding simultaneous liver-kidney transplantation; n 5 904 match runs) because the decision to accept or decline these offers is influenced by factors outside the scope of this analysis. We also excluded directed-donation organ offers (n 5 317 match runs) or offers for which critical donor data (eg, age) were missing (n 5 14 match runs).
COVARIATES
Recipient covariates included the following: age, sex, allocation MELD score (the higher value of the calculated or exception MELD score), race/ethnicity, (7) previous LT, and receipt of hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) or other exception points (which increase a patient's priority beyond their calculated MELD score (7) ). Donor covariates included the following: sex, height, weight, age, race/ethnicity, cause of death, donation after cardiac death (DCD) status, rank position on match run, and share type. Changes in organ acceptance under even broader organ sharing (redistricting) would likely be even greater that what was seen under Share 35. Based on our data, this could pose major logistical and operational challenges, while potentially increasing discard rates which would lead to a decrease in the total number of transplant nationally. Local transplant center density was modeled as the number of LT centers within a DSA. All of these factors have previously been shown to be associated with acceptance of organ offers. (6) Lastly, we evaluated the interaction of era (before versus after Share 35) and MELD category of match run (<35, 35, and status 1). We included patients from regions 8 and 9, as these regions already had broader regional sharing in place prior to Share 35 (both before 2007), and status 1 patients. This inclusion allowed us to determine if observed changes in acceptance rates were likely related to the Share 35 policy, or temporal changes in acceptance patterns independent of Share 35. Thus, status 1 patients and patients from regions 8 and 9 served as controls for a pseudo difference-in-differences approach for regional analyses and MELD status comparisons as changes in acceptance rates for these patients would be more likely to reflect temporal changes in acceptance, not influenced by Share 35.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The primary outcome was whether an organ offer was accepted (yes/no). We used mixed-effects logistic regression models with patient-and center-level random intercepts, accounting for donor and recipient factors associated with organ offer acceptance and organ quality, including components of the donor risk index (DRI). (2, 8) These models were used to account for variability in acceptance rates across transplant centers after adjustment for recipient and donor characteristics among all included match runs, while also testing for heterogeneity among transplant centers. These random intercepts were included because individual patients are clustered within transplant centers, which could lead to correlated outcomes of patients within those clusters. This is distinct from a traditional fixed effect (ie, sex, age) that has levels that are of primary interest, whereas random effects are considered as being selected from a much larger set of levels. (9) Multilevel models were used because of the 2 levels of clustering: patients within centers, and individual patients themselves because of the potential to have multiple organ offers for the same patient. For example, the decision to accept an organ for a given patient may be correlated among patients within centers, and among individual patients with multiple offers.
(9) To determine whether there was among-center variability in acceptance rates, the null hypothesis was that there was no residual heterogeneity (eg, after accounting for all of the covariates in the model, the acceptance rates among centers are statistically not different from one another). A P value <0.05 suggested that there were significant differences in organ offer acceptance rates after adjusting for the observed covariates in the model.
(10) Adjusted center acceptance rates were then calculated using the output of the multivariate model (postestimation commands in Stata, version 13.0; StataCorp, College Station, TX) that standardized each center's observed acceptance rate to the expected rate based on the model. (11) These analyses only included centers with 25 organ offers in a given category to prevent biased results due to small sample sizes. Lastly, we focused on donor quality of offers using the DRI (12) as well as other features highly associated with donor "quality" (donor age and whether donor was a donation after brain death [DBD] or DCD). The specific reason for organ refusal (donor refusal codes) was included in secondary analyses. (8, 13) This study received approval from the institutional review board at the University of Pennsylvania and was reviewed and approved by UNOS/HRSA.
Results
There were 25,619 unique adult patients ranked in the top 5 of at least 1 match run during the study period, of whom 8552 (33.4%) reached an allocation MELD score 35 at least once. The demographic characteristics of wait-list candidates ranked in the top 5 of a match run while having an allocation MELD score 35 were not clinically different before versus after Share 35 (Table 1) . However, there were significant differences in the etiology of liver disease (P < 0.001); notably, 18.4% of patients with an allocation MELD score 35 had alcohol-induced liver disease before Share 35 compared with 24.2% after Share 35 (Table 1) . Of the pre-Share 35 wait-list candidates who achieved an allocation MELD score 35, the mean number of offers while ranked in the top 5 positions was 2.1 (standard deviation [SD], 1.2), compared with 2.9 (SD, 1.4) for allocation MELD score 35 wait-list candidates in the post-Share 35 era (P < 0.001).
OVERALL ORGAN OFFER ACCEPTANCE RATES BEFORE VERSUS AFTER SHARE 35
Overall liver offer acceptance rates for adult patients ranked in the top 5 of a match run decreased in the post-Share 35 era. However, the unadjusted acceptance rates before versus after Share 35 varied based on donor characteristics and whether the liver offer was local (donor and recipient in same DSA) or regional (donor and recipient in same region but different DSA). The absolute decrease in unadjusted acceptance rates was most pronounced among regional offers of DBD donors <60 years of age ("highest quality") and local DCD offers, all of which had an absolute decrease in acceptance rates of 10%, with less pronounced differences in acceptance rates for local offers and regional offers of older donors (Fig. 1A) .
When the reasons for organ declines were evaluated, there was an increase in the absolute number of declines for all major refusal categories, but the greatest relative increase was declines for refusal code 803, "Patient transplanted, transplant in progress, or other offer being considered" (Fig. 1B) .
In multivariate models, there were several donor and recipient factors that were associated with organ offer acceptance ( Table 2) . Liver offer acceptance rates were lower in areas with increased local competition (increasing number of transplant centers in a given DSA; consistent with published literature (8) ), lower rank on a match run, and whether the donor was in a different DSA than the wait-list candidate (Table 2) .
There was a significant interaction between Share 35 era and MELD category (P < 0.001; Fig. 1C ). Using liver offers to patients with an allocation MELD score <35 in the pre-Share 35 era as the reference, there was a slight decrease in the probability of having an organ offer accepted after Share 35 for a patient with an allocation MELD score <35 (odds ratio [OR], 0.90; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.85-0.94). Before Share 35, a given liver offer was significantly more likely to be *Primary exposures of model were allocation MELD, Share 35 era, and the interaction of these 2 variables (Fig. 1) . Model was mixed-effects logistic regression model with individual centerlevel random intercepts. The P < 0.001 indicated that there was residual heterogeneity between transplant centers after accounting for the patient demographic and geographic factors in the multivariate model based on the test of random center effects. Recipient race/ethnicity was forced into the model but not shown because it was not significant (P > 0.05 
ORGAN QUALITY OF ACCEPTED VERSUS DECLINED ORGANS BASED ON MELD SCORE AND ERA
Organs that were accepted were significantly "better" based on the objective DRI measure (P < 0.001; significantly lower DRI values) across MELD categories and era (Fig. 2) . However, there was no clinically meaningful difference in the DRI of livers that were declined for patients with an allocation MELD score <35 in the preversus post-Share 35 era, or for those with an allocation MELD score 35 in the pre-versus post-Share 35 era (Fig. 2) .
REGIONAL CHANGES IN ORGAN OFFER ACCEPTANCE RATES
At the regional level, the changes in organ offer acceptance rates were not uniform across the 11 OPTN/ UNOS regions. Importantly, regions 8 and 9 served as reference points as they had regional sharing to differing degrees prior to implementation of Share 35 (region 8 started regional sharing in 2007 for patients with a MELD score 29 while region 9 uses a single candidate list). There was an absolute decrease in organ offer acceptance rates (post-Share 35 acceptance rate-pre-Share 35 acceptance rate) for patients with an allocation MELD 35 in every OPTN/UNOS region among all organ offers (Fig. 3A) . These changes were greater in regions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 11, compared with reference regions 8 and 9. This pattern was also seen among the "best" donors: DBD < 60 years of age ( Fig. 3B ; changes greater than region 9 in regions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11) and DBD donors <40 years of age ( Fig. 3C ; changes greater than region 9 in regions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 11). 
AMONG-CENTER CHANGES IN ACCEPTANCE RATES BASED ON ALLOCATION MELD SCORE
There were significant changes in organ offer acceptance rates at the center level before versus after Share 35, and these changes varied across centers (P < 0.001). These center-level changes in acceptance rates were also different for patients with an allocation MELD score <35 and 35. Of the 101 transplant centers that had 25 offers before and after Share 35 for a MELD <35 patient, 18 (17.8%) had an increase in their organ offer acceptance rates, whereas 83 (82.2%) had a decrease (Fig. 4A) . By contrast, of the 81 centers that had 25 offers before and after Share 35 for a MELD 35, only 1 (1.2%) increased its organ offer acceptance rates, whereas 80 (98.8%) had a decrease in their liver acceptance rates (Fig. 4B ).
Discussion
Implementation of Share 35 was associated with a significant decrease in offer acceptances for patients with an allocation MELD score 35 but not for patients with an allocation MELD < 35. The policy appears to have directly led to changes in organ acceptance behaviors, given that the changes in acceptance rates for patients with a MELD score 35 were significantly greater than regions 8 and 9, which already had broader sharing, in 7 out of the 9 other regions. Beyond changes at the regional level, these changes varied among OPTN/UNOS regions and also among transplant centers within the same region. Behavioral changes are important to understand for a number of reasons. First, they cannot be modeled in LSAM, even though behavior can be predicted, and is done in other fields (ie, behavioral economics). Behavior change introduces instability in model prediction, which leads to potentially inaccurate predictions if the models do not represent actual clinical practice. However, understanding how changes to allocation may actually affect behavior in the community allows us to better predict how future policies might impact behavior and thereby policy outcomes. In particular, these results may provide insight into how broader sharing proposals might actually perform and what might negatively impact the goals of the policy. Finally, understanding how policies influence behavior might assist in policy design to produce a more desirable final result.
There is a nascent body of literature exploring organ offer data in LT and variability in organ offer acceptance rates among transplant centers. (3, 8, (13) (14) (15) However, only 1 prior publication evaluated the changes in organ offer acceptance rates in response to a change in an organ allocation policy. (3) In their analysis, Washburn et al. found that after Share 35, organ offer acceptance rates declined only for patients with an allocation MELD score 35. (3) This work highlighted important findings in behavioral changes after Share 35, but had important limitations, including the following:
1. A focus on all organ offers, regardless of rank position (which treats all organ declines equally). 2. Excluded regions 8 and 9, thus neglecting an important "control" group for a pseudo differencein-differences approach. 3. Only evaluated a single year of data. 4. Did not evaluate regional and center-level changes. 5. Did not account for correlated outcomes among individual patients with multiple offers and centers receiving offers on behalf of multiple patients.
Our study validates and expands the early data from Washburn et al. (Fig.  1A) . Although some of the difference may be related to the longer-term follow-up or difference in methods, these data highlight a dramatic change in practice patterns after Share 35 that does not correct with time.
At the level of the OPTN/UNOS region, we saw that liver acceptance rates among all centers in a region decreased, and these region-wide decreases in acceptance rates were greater among 7 out of the 9 regions not previously in regional share agreements prior to the Share 35 policy (regions 8 and 9 already had regional sharing). This suggests that changes in acceptance were directly attributable to the policy. Center-level data reinforce the finding that 99% of centers had a decrease for patients with an allocation MELD score 35. This further suggests that Share 35 changed practice patterns beyond what had been suggested as better matching of donor and recipient. In favor of this fact is the unchanged DRI in both MELD <35 and MELD 35 transplant recipients.
Our observation that the greatest relative reason for decline was "Patient transplanted, transplant in progress, or other offer being considered" suggests that as patients receive additional offers, centers act more selectively to attempt to use the best potential offer for their patients. The DRI data were virtually unchanged before versus after Share 35 for organs that were accepted or declined, and would suggest that despite increased offers, the ultimately used graft had similar quality to organs the center had previously declined. Thus, there is a cost to the system with respect to operational and logistical inefficiency without demonstrable benefit to the patient.
As our community considers further expansion to sharing, our findings present very relevant findings and have significant implications to the path. Our data would suggest that broader sharing will result in a greater number of declines by centers, leading to reduced operation efficiency. This would provide an explanation for LSAM predictions of increased turndowns and fewer transplants with the redistricting proposal. (16) In addition, organ placement may take more time and will be subject to less certainty. Declining an organ with advanced notice, due to an actual or anticipated better offer is understandable and should not affect the allocation process. However, a late decline in response to receiving an alternative and "better" organ (perceived or truly better) does have important ramifications that affect the logistics of organ placement (ie, OPOs needing to rapidly place an organ) and could lead to more grave consequences (ie, an organ being discarded because of a late decline and an inability to find a candidate in the desired time window). Unfortunately, the nature of match run data prevents us from answering these specific questions that might lead to a better understanding of how decisions impact efficiency. Nevertheless, the results point to the need to consider behavioral changes in response to a policy, which currently are not considered from current LT policy development.
These data demonstrate important changes in clinician behavior in response to a policy that must be considered when designing and simulating the impact of future policies. Prior work by our group demonstrated organ offer acceptance rates were lower in DSAs with multiple transplant centers, compared with singlecenter DSAs, contrary to what many thought. (8) Whether adding more centers to areas of organ sharing will lead to an additional impact is unclear. We had hypothesized that these findings were explained by competition changing behavior in order to maximize outcomes for patients not ranked at the top of the list, while still allowing the sickest patients to be transplanted. Unfortunately, we demonstrated that the behavior or organ selection appeared detrimental to some patients because patients at the top of the waiting list at centers with lower acceptance rates had higher mortality, despite having offers while the patients were active on the list prior to their death. (8) This analysis did have limitations. The available data only include the date of the organ offer, and not the time. Furthermore, it does not include whether a patient initially had >1 provisional acceptance, and subsequently declined an organ and/or had simultaneous offers. For this reason, we cannot make firm conclusions as to why an organ offer was declined. However, that organ declines decreased as a result of the policy was the main focus of the analyses. Second, there may be other factors beyond those available in the data set that are markers of organ quality. Although this may be true, the similar DRI of organs that was accepted or declined before versus after Share 35 suggests that the overall organ quality did not change substantially. Third, we could not assess other factors that may have influenced organ declines at the center level (ie, new surgical teams). Despite this, it would not explain the dramatic among-center variability.
Our current system of policy assessment relies on LSAM to predict the impact of changes in allocation and distribution policy. Unfortunately, LSAM does not account for behavioral changes. (17) The behavior changes that are evident with Share 35 introduce significant uncertainty as to LSAM's ability to predict the outcomes of future policy changes. Behavior changes among centers need to be addressed if broader sharing through redistricting was enacted. Under the current 8 district redistricting proposal, the largest district would have 38 centers, and this district would perform 25% of all LTs in the United States. (16) A potential and unanticipated change in acceptance behavior, which would not be anticipated by LSAM, appears likely based on the data we outline above. Variable organ acceptance might present a logistical nightmare for the OPOs operating within the system and an unruly process could increase discard rates and thus decrease the total number of transplants nationally.
